We propose a generative model for adversarial attack. The model generates subtle but predictive patterns from the input. To perform an attack, it replaces the patterns of the input with those generated based on examples from some other class. We demonstrate our model by attacking CNN on MNIST.
Introduction
Recent researches show that machine learning models are vulnerable to adversarial attacks Szegedy et al. (2014) ; Goodfellow, Shlens, and Szegedy (2015) . Slightly modifications on input data can fool a state-of-the-art classifier. The adversarial brittleness restricts applications of machine learning models in high security fields, and thus both adversarial attacks and defenses have attracted significant attention these years.
Based on the amount of knowledge the adversary has about the target model, adversarial attacks can be categorized into white box attacks and black box attacks (Kurakin et al., 2018) . In white box scenarios, the adversary has all the knowledge about the target model, including the model architecture and all the parameter values, while in the black box scenarios, the adversary can only "query" the target model with input data to obtain the output, or even is not allowed to do this.
Most white box attacks generate adversarial examples by directly performing optimization in input space under some norm constraints encouraging visual realism. Instead, we consider to generate the perturbations through a generative model. It is observed that unrecognizable images which do not resemble images from the training set but which typically look like noise while still being classified by the model with high confidence Schott et al. (2019) . Inspired by this observation, we propose to use a generative model to generate a subtle but predictive patterns from the raw input, and construct adversarial examples by replacing the input's predictive patterns with those from another class.
Methodology
Problem Definition Given a target classifier y = f (x), which make decision based on the conditional density of y given x, i.e., f (x) = arg max yp (y|x).
One example of such a conditional density is a deep neural network with softmax as the output function of the last layer. We want to fool the classifier f (x) by slightly perturbing the input. Instead of learning the perturbations by performing optimization in the input space, we propose to extract the subtle but predictive patterns from the input x and replace them with the patterns extracted from some example of another class. In particular, We model the predictive patterns with a generative model.
Model Given a labeled example (x, y) ∈ R d ×R, we associate it with a random variable η ∈ R d . We desire η contains all the predictive information of x with respect to y. Therefore we assume that y is independent of x given η, i.e.,
where the density of y conditioned on η is exactly the conditional density the target classifier f (x) built upon. Also, we assume the input lies on a low dimensional manifold, and thus there exists a low dimensional latent variable z ∈ R m conditioned on which x and η are independent, i.e.,
where p(η|z) = p(η|NN(z, y)) and p(z|x) = p(z|NN(x, y)) are Gaussian density parameterized by neural networks. In order to extract class dependent patterns, we make the neural networks also take y as input. Then the conditional density of y given x is
Learning To learn the parameters, We minimize the following objective function,
Algorithm 1 Adversarial Attacks
Input: a test example (x * , y * ), a target class y t , the target classifier f , the encoder p(z|NN(x, y)), the decoder p(η|NN(z, y)), the norm bound , and the maximum number of iterations K Output: an adversarial example
All the expectations are taken with respect to reparameterizable densities and are estimated using Monte Carlo integration. Note that we do not modify any parameters of the target modelp(y|η). The last term is an additional regularization term, which enforces the norm of η does not exceed certain threshold in expectation, where r( η , ) = relu( η − ). We use the L ∞ norm throughout the paper.
The objective (5) consists of three terms. The first term is a lower bound of the log-marginal likelihood and encourages η to contain all the predictive information. The second KL divergence term regularizes the encoder p(z|x) towards a standard Gaussian density. The last term is also an additional regularization term, which enforces the norm of η does not exceed certain threshold in expectation, where r( η , ) = relu( η − ). We use the L ∞ norm throughout the paper.
Attack To perform attack, we replace the predictive patterns η * of a given test example (x * , y * ) with the patterns η t of some example (x t , y t ) from a target class y t . In the case of non-targeted attack, we choose to use the class as which the target classifier most probably misclassifies x * , i.e.,
To do this, we pass the test example (x * , y * ) and the target example (x t , t ) to our model to obtain the patterns η * and η t , respectively. Then we replace the patterns in the test input x * by settingx
After every modification, we clip the modified input to enforce the L ∞ norm of its difference with the raw input x * is below the threshold . The whole attack procedure is repeated until the target classifier make a mistake or a given maximum number of iterations is reached. We give a summarize of the attack in Algorithm 1.
Experiments Configurations
Hyperparameters and implementation details The architecture of the proposed model: The encoder has 2 layers Adv.
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Figure 1: A visualization of the attack procedure. The three rows show the raw image, the image with generated patterns subtracted, and the adversarial image (the image with patterns replaced). The true labels and the predictions given by the target classifier is shown at the top and the bottom, respectively.
with kernel sizes= [5, 5] , strides= [1, 2, 2, 1] and feature map sizes= [784, 256] . The Decoder architecture has also 2 layers with kernel sizes= [5, 5] , strides= [1, 2, 2, 1] and feature map sizes= [256, 784] . The first layers have RELU activation functions, the last layer is a full connection layer, and all layers except the last one use Batch Normalization. We trained the proposed model with the Adam optimizer. We tuned the dimension L of the latent space (ending up with L = 30); started with a high weight for the KL-divergence term at the beginning of training (which was gradually decreased from a factor of 10 to 1 over 50 epochs);
Hyperparameters for the attack model We set the adversarial perturbation size L∞ = 0.3 as a threshold. We set the number of the iteration t = 30 as a threshold.
Hyperparameters for the target model The architecture of the CNNs has kernel sizes = [5, 4, 3, 5] , strides = [1, 2, 2, 1], and feature map sizes = [20, 70, 256, 10] . All layers use ELU activation functions and all layers except the last one apply Batch Normalization. The CNNs are both trained on the cross entropy loss with the Adam optimizer. The parameters maximizing the test cross entropy.
Evaluation
We evaluate our model on MNIST. We apply our model to generate adversarial examples to a convolutional neural network (CNN). We generate adversarial examples under an L ∞ bound of 0.3. Table 2 : Average Norm of Generated Patterns ing on the generated patterns solely, and it achieve 100% accuracy on the test set. We report the average L ∞ norm of the generated patterns from each class in Table 2 . It can be seen that the norm of generated patterns are below the threshold on average.
In Figure 1 , we give a visualization of the images under the attack procedure. We also plot changes in scores the target classifier assigning to different classes during attack in Figure 2 . We can see that the score of the true label given by the target classifier decreases after the generated patterns are subtracted from the raw input, and the score of the target class increases significantly after the patterns of the input are replaced.
